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of Williams 8c Wilkins for Librarians 
ROGER D. BILLINGS, JR. 
IN 1975 LIBRARIANS celebrated their newly-won freedom to supply mate- 
rials to library users. The Williams & Wilkins decision, decided by a 
narrow majority of 4-3 in the Court of Claims,' and affirmed 4-4 by a 
divided Supreme Court' seemed to promise liberal photocopying privi- 
leges of scholarly materials. Williams & Wilkins was dealt with imme- 
diately in Section 108 of the 1976 Copyright Ace and the question 
remains, how well was i t  dealt with from the librarian's point of view? 
Section 108 laid down restrictive rules for photocopying. Whether the 
liberal privileges of Williams & Wilkins have lingering vitality is an 
unanswered question. 
The 1976 Act set down for the first time in Section 107 the general 
factors for determining fair use that were previously found only in case 
law. Recent cases construing these factors give librarians an idea how far 
they can go in copying works in their collections. These cases do not 
always provide startling results. They merely continue for the most part 
the protection given owners in pre-1976 cases. In this discussion, cases 
dealing with copyrighted materials of special interest to librarians have 
been selected for comment. The Sony Betamax case4 promises to be 
instructive, although it is too early to know the impact of that case on 
libraries. Cases on computer programs and computerized information 
retrieval have also engendered case law worthy of comment. Cases 
dealing with materials intended merely for entertainment, although of 
incidental interest to librarians, are omitted, as are cases involving 
fabric designs, toys, decorative objects, and the like. 
Roger D. Billings, Jr.  is Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky 
University, Highland Heights, Kentucky. 
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Williams & Wilkins Today 
In enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress apparently meant to 
do away with the library photocopyingprivilege. It did so in Section 108 
giving library photocopying a separate, narrow exemption from the 
rule against reproduction of copyrighted works. Section 10S5 authorizes 
a library to make a single copy for private use of one article from a 
collection or periodical issue, or a small part of any other work, pro- 
vided the copying is not systematic or concerted. The exception does not 
apply to a separate musical work, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work, or a motion picture or other audiovisual work other than an 
audiovisual work dealing with the news. Contrast this limited privilege 
with the broad privilege in Williams & Wilkins under which govern- 
ment agency libraries reproduced articles from medical journals and 
systematically provided them on request to business firms, scientists and 
other libraries. 
The narrow privilege of Section 108 seems to bypass the four factors 
in Section 1076 governing fair use in general, and discussed in the 
Williams & Wilkinsdecision. The United States Senate, in its Commit- 
tee Report? intended this result. It said that, since Williams & Wilkins 
“failed to illuminate the application of fair use doctrine to library 
photocopying practices” Section 108 will provide “a balanced resolu- 
tion of the photocopying issue.” Yet neither of the other two major 
sources of legislative history, the House Committee’ and Conference 
Reports? discusses Williams & Wilkinsat all. Do these muddled signals 
mean that courts are free to expand the photocopying privilege beyond 
Section 108 by applying the general factors of Section 107? Nocourt has 
ventured so far, but the ambiguity of the legislative history could 
ultimately provide the ammunition to break away from some of the 
restrictions of Section 108. 
Another unexplained thing about Section 108 is that it provides a 
statutory restraint on librarians whereas no special statutory restraint is 
placed on educators. Instead, educators’ photocopying privileges are set 
forth in the now-familiar “Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not- 
for-profit Educational Institutions.”” The drafters of the 1976 Copy- 
right Act could not reach a consensus on a statutory provision for 
educational photocopying and instead urged interested parties to agree 
on guidelines which the drafters included in the legislative history. This 
was a back-door means of promulgating special rules for photocopying. 
Technically, the guidelines are not the law. Judges are free to 
ignore them and use the general Section 107 factors in shaping privi- 
leges of fair use for educators. However, they have achieved some legiti- 
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macy, for in two cases courts have incorporated them in consent 
judgments. Both cases resulted from a coordinated effort of the Associa- 
tion of American Publishers (AAP) whereby several publishers sued a 
commercial photocopying firm for illegally producing photocopy 
anthologies for use on university campuses. In Basac Books, Znc. u. 
Gnomon Corp.” the publ ished2 alleged that substantial portions of 
textbooks and general trade books, including whole chapters, and arti- 
cles from journals were assembled for use by entire classes. In the 
consent judgment the copying mill was “permanently enjoined and 
restrained from making multiple copies of any copyrighted, published 
work or any part or portion of such work” without the owner’s written 
consent.13 The decree further specified that Gnomon could furnish 
multiple copies to faculty members of nonprofit educational institu- 
tions provided they fill out a form specifying they complied with the 
guidelines, kept the form on file for a year, and gave the publishers 
access to Gnomon’s premises to inspect the forms for compliance with 
the decree.14 A second suit resulted in a ~imilardecree.’~ Finally, in 1982, 
dismayed that the previous litigation failed to chill copying on a mas- 
sive scale, the AAP financed another suit naming for the first time a 
university (New York IJniversity) and nine of its professors as defend- 
ant5 along with the off-campus photocopying service. (Editors’ note: In 
1983 this case was settled out of court with the universityand the faculty 
members agreeing to abide by a policy setting forth specific procedures 
based on  the law and the Congressional guidelines. A separate agree- 
ment with the copying center provides that the center will require 
written permission and authorization from the owner of the copyright 
or a faculty member abiding by the policy, or the approval of the 
university’s general counsel.)“j 
Meanwhile, the AAP has been chipping away at Wzllzams & Wzl-
kzns. The first step was to sponsor the nonprofit Copyright Clearance 
Center (CCC) in Salem, Massachusetts with authority to grant photoc- 
opying privileges to libraries and others in return for per-page royalty 
payments. Publishers who registered their journals with the CCC auth- 
orized users to photocopy without obtaining specific permission in 
advance. It was assumed the CCC would answer the argument raised in 
Wzlliams & Wilkzns that users should not have to purchase extra copies 
of a journal if they wished to distribute just one article, and that some 
older journals were no  longer available for purchase at a11.17 
When royalties did not flow in, publishers of technical and scien- 
tific journals sued American Cyanamid Company” and E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc.lg for unlawfully copying articles. As in the “copy mill” cases, 
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these cases were settled out of court. The agreements provided that the 
companies would register with the CCC as users and pay copying fees. 
Cyanamid and Squibb declared their intention to restrict copying to 
designated central copying facilities or other specified equipment. The 
Squibb agreement allows Squibb to exclude from reporting and paying 
as many as 6 percent of copies made. This exclusion was based on 
Squibb’s estimate of the amount of copying that was fair use. Squibb 
would not have to report to the CCC anything more than the Interna- 
tional Standard Book or Serial Number of each publication or journal 
copies, the volume number, year of publication, number of copies 
made, and the applicable copying fee. 
A few lessons may be learned from the litigation program of the 
AAP. The Guidelines for Classroom Copying” are viable. The AAP 
campaign to breathe life into the CCC has been directed so far only at 
for-profit corporate libraries. The inclination to settle with Squibb for 
even a limited exemption of six percent indicates that more liberal 
settlements might be available to libraries of nonprofit institutions. 
Finally, the inclusion of professors in the latest suit against New York 
IJniversity signals an end of the road for polite treatment of educators 
and educational libraries. Heretofore the AAP would not touch the 
educational establishment directly because i t  represented its most con- 
centrated source of revenue. AAP member publishers stood by for 
almost two decades as the professors whom their representatives visited 
undercut their market in the name o f  an undefined educational photoc- 
opying privilege. 
Beyond Print Media-The Sony Case 
Section 108 again spells trouble for librarians in the area of off-the- 
air videocopying. In ruling that home videocopying constituted copy- 
right infringement, the Court of Appeals in Universal City Studios u. 
SonyZ1noted that Section 108(h) prohibits copying of audiovisual 
works, other than works dealing with the news, and that even works 
dealing with news could be copied only for lending and no other 
purpose. It concluded, “In light of this caution with respect to the 
limited Section 108 exemption, it is clear that Congress did not intend to 
create a blanket exemption for home videorecording. ... ,,22 The Ameri- 
ran Library Association (ALA) vigorously opposed this interpretation, 
arguing that such references tend to ignore development of rights under 
Section 107 by implying that section 108 defines the outer limits of a 
library’s rights.23 
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ALA identified another device of the Court of Appeals which 
would relegate libraries to the Section 108 privileges. The court said that 
home videocopying was for an intrinsic use (entertainment), not a 
productive use (research). Copying should be permitted only for pro- 
ductive uses. Thus, if copying is for an intrinsic use (which automati- 
cally cannot be a fair use) no further reference to Section 107 factors is 
necessary. Rather, the factors are irrelevant. 
Libraries, then, would be deprived of any relief gleaned from the 
Section 107 factors unless they could prove their copying was for a 
productive use. For libraries to prove a user was making a productive 
use, they would have to intrude upon the privacy of the user. This they 
refuse to do for ethical reasons quite apart form any legal reasons. Recall 
that the 1976 Act itself recognizes librarians are not required to police 
the use of copyrighted materials. Section 108(f) states that: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability for 
copyright infringement upon a library or archives or its employees for 
the unsupervised use of reproducing equipment located on its pre- 
mises: Provided, that such equipment displays a notice that the mak- 
ing of a copy may be subject to the copyright law. 
One case has tested the ability of the equivalent of an educational 
library to copy programs off-the-air. In Encyclopaedia Britannica u. C.  
N .  Crooksz4 the court found infringement in the Erie County N.Y. 
Board of Cooperative Educational Services’ (BOCES) massive, unauth- 
orized videotaping of copyrighted motion pictures for distribution to its 
member schools. Surely the case is an embarrassment to librarians who 
wish for some discretion in copying off-the-air. ALA itself seems com- 
fortable only with copying for the convenience of users who do not own 
recorders or otherwise have access to programs, followed by erasure of 
the copies.% Futhermore, a recent set of guidelines promulgated by an 
advisory committee of owners and users would permit copying for 
replay by educators only with erasure foi-ty-five days later.26 
In the BOCES case, the cooperative copied programs even though 
they were available for purchase, and kept some of them for ten years. In 
contrast, some articles from scientific journals in Will iams 8c Wilk ins  
were not readily available. In that case and others certain key phrases are 
discernible. They will probably serve in future cases as guideposts in 
determining fair use. Massive copying, indefinite retention of copies, 
and intrinsic use are factors militating against the privilege. Productive 
use for research or teaching purposes and difficulty in purchasing 
copies are factors tending to support the privilege. 
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Computer Programs and Databases 
Computer programs and databases, even though expressed in 
numbers or symbols instead of words, are considered “literary works” 
regarless that they are embodied in tapes, disks, chips, or cards.27 As such 
they are copyrighted. 
Presumably, libraries may make copies of programs on the limited 
basis afforded in Section 108. Additionally, they may adapt programs 
they own to facilitate loading them into their computers, and may make 
archival copies to guard against damage or destruction.28 It should be 
noted that programs may be protected alternatively under federal patent 
laws and state trade secret laws, but with the proliferation of personal 
computers, copyright protection has become the method of choice. It is 
easier and cheaper to register a copyright than to obtain a patent, and 
the term is life of the creator plus fifty years, or, in the case of an 
employee of a firm, 100 years from creation or seventy-five years from 
publication, whichever is less. 
A significant problem clouds the copyright protection for compu- 
ter programs. The program may be expressed in a source code or an 
object code and a copy of the program in source code form can be easily 
read by a computer expert. A copy in object code form cannot be read, as 
the object is a rendering of the source code into machine-readable form. 
A source code may give rise to several machine-readable forms. One 
example is the silicon chip or ROM (read-only memory). In early 
litigation the courts divided as to whether the ROM is a protected copy 
or merely a part of the computer machine. 29 Probably, the issue will be 
settled in favor of both source and object codes being copyrighted, for 
otherwise the future for any protection of programs seems bleak. 
Computer databases are protected as if they were compilations. 
Compilations are collections of preexisting materials selected, coordi- 
nated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole 
constitutes an original work of a~thorsh ip .~’Examples of compilations 
are credit reference books3’ and the list of stocks that form the basis for 
the Dow Jones stock index3’ Even a telephone book (a handy item fora 
computer database) is Copyrighted as a ~ o m p i l a t i o n . ~ ~  
T o  the extent computer databases are collections of text materials, 
the future of copyright protection is bleak. Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool 
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology writes in D a e d a l u ~ ~ ~that 
computer memories will be personalized by each computer owner and 
no original text will remain original for long. Texts will be passed 
along with variations from one computer toanother with theresult that 
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i t  will be practically as difficult to trace the origin of a text as i t  is to trace 
the origin of a conversation. 
Government and Legal Materials in the Public Domain 
Copyright protection is not available for any work prepared by an 
officer or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person’s 
official duties.35 Thus, most works of the U S .  Government Printing 
Office arc in the public domain. Off-duty speeches of the naval officer, 
Hyman Rickover, are his own copyrighted but transcripts of 
Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations are in the public domain 
because the conversations were made as part of his official duties.37 
Works created by U.S. Postal Service employees may be copyrighted 
because, technically, under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, they 
are not government employees. 38 Postal stamp designs, manuals and 
directories could be copyrighted, for example. Furthermore, the Stand- 
ard Reference Data Ace9 authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to secure 
copyright for standardized scientific and technical data. 
A continuing problem has been the status of works prepared by 
nongovernment persons under a commission from the government. 
The rule stated in the legislative history4’ is that the creator of a work 
under a government contract may secure copyright in the work if the 
contract says nothing to the contrary. The leading case under the 1976 
Act is Schnapper u. F ~ l e y . ~ ~In that case the producer of five films about 
the Supreme Court entitled “Equal Justice Under Law” obtained a 
certificate of registration from the Copyright Office. The plaintiff 
brought an action to invalidate the copyright on the grounds the films 
were commissioned by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, an 
agency of the government. The court held for the producer’s right to 
own the copyright, provided that the government did not commission 
the films for its own use merely as an alternative to having one of i ts  
employees prepare the work. 
Finally, problems recently have arisen concerning legal materials 
in the public domain. It has long been settled that individuals cannot 
hold copyright in the works of legislators or judges. Thus, judicial 
opinions, trial records, statutes promulgated by legislators and their 
debates are in the public domain, although the headnotes and commen- 
taries of private publishers are copyrighted. Recently, litigation resulted 
over the question whether a privately developed model municipal 
building code was injected into the public domain when the Massachu- 
setts legislature adopted it as part of its official state regulations. The 
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court ruled that once officially adopted, the code could be copied by 
anyone. 42 In another tasr the question was whether thestateof Georgia 
could control its own statutes in such a way as to give a copyright 
monopoly to one publishing company. In a suit against an alleged 
infringer, the state lost.43 The court decided that the public must have 
free access to state laws, unhampered by any claim of copyright, even by 
the state. The state’s argument that it needed control of its statutes to 
insure their accuracy was rejected. 
Music 
Musical works are especially susceptible to copyright infringement 
in schools and colleges. “Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music” 
were promulgated in the legislative history of the 1976 Act.44 Recently, 
the Kansas State Department of Education requested a ruling from the 
state’s attorney general on whether music educators may copy musical 
works for use of judges in music competitions. The attorney general 
advised that they may not do sobrcause if all teachers could make copies 
for all judges in all music competitions the market for the music would 
decrease.45 Nothing in the “Guidelines” or among the fair-use factors 
would sanction massive copying of entire scores (as opposed to 
excerpts), even if they are to be used for comment or criticism. 
The 1976Act exempts from infringement performance of music in 
classrooms for teaching or in churches for religious purposes,46 but only 
if copies of the music used for performance are lawfully obtained. In 
F.E.L. Publtcattons u. Catholtc Biship of Chicago47a music publisher 
sued the church for making illegal copies to be used in exempt church 
service performances. The publisher, F.E.L., had offered an annual 
license to each parish permitting unlimited copying, but no more than 
thirty out of 447 parishes purchased the licenses. The defendant suc- 
ceeded in getting the suit dismissed in the trial court on grounds F.E.L.’s 
license was so restrictive as to violate the antitrust laws, but the Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court, thus paving the way for F.E.L. to 
proceed with its copyright infringement action.48 Churches and non- 
profit schools have no fair-use privilege to copy whole musical works on 
a massive scale, even i f  nonprofit performance of the music is permitted. 
In other words, the exemption extends only to performances at which 
participants perform from memory, unless they choose to purchase 
copies of the music. 
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The Four Factors of Section 107 
Factor 1: T h e  Purpose and Character of the Use 
The purpose and character of the use of a work requires the consid- 
eration of whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purpose^.^' 
In recognizing the dichotomy between commercial and noncom- 
mercial uses, courts have been creative in their character-use analysis. In 
Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Crooks5’ owners of audiovisual works 
asked for a temporary injunction barring a school system from duplicat- 
ing the works without permission. The court bypassed the fact the 
defendant was a school system, admitting the case was indistinguisha- 
ble from Williams & Wilkins  in this respect,51 and found a “highly 
organized and systematic program for reproducing videotape on a mas- 
sive scale. ”52Crooksinvolved the Erie Co. NY BOCES’ videotaping 
educational television programs onto a master copy and then making a 
list of the programs available to teachers. The master would remain at 
the copying center and another copy would be made for the teacher.53 
Defendant’s strongest argument was that the time-shifting made pro- 
grams available to students “since many of the programs are televised 
when classes are not in session or at times that do not coincide with 
coverage of the subject in a particular course of study....”54 
The court pointed out two differences between this case and Willi-
ams & Wilkins. First, Williams& Wilkins  limited the request to a single 
article and fifty pages, while in Crooks the whole film was copied.55 
Second, BOCES’ copying could have a substantial effect on the 
market.56 Significantly, the court had no problem finding infringement 
by an educational institution even where there was no possibility of 
commercial use. The court suggested that a licensing agreement could 
and should be arranged.57 
In Crooks, there was a noncommercial, educational purpose and 
yet an infringement was found. In contrast, no  infringement was found 
in Brurzone u. Miller Brewing CO.,~’ even though the infringer was a 
for-profit corporation. Bruzzone operated a market research firm which 
published a newsletter to the advertising and marketing community. He 
also did commission work to study one particular company’s marketing 
effe~tiveness.~’Questionnaires were sent to a random sampling of peo-
ple together with pictures or dialogue from the commercial to be stu- 
died.60 The court said that “Useful, reliable market research results have 
value for the public, assist in keeping the competitive marketplace free 
FALL 1983 191 
ROGER BILLINGS 
from distortion and confusion, and, in general, are an essential aspect ot 
a healthy consumer economy.”61 The court gave more weight to the use 
made of the copyrighted material than the nature of the user. 
Another criterion courts have used to determine purpose and char- 
acter is whether some public interest was involved.@ In Key Maps, Inc. 
u. P r ~ i t t ~ ~a fire marshal1 of Texas county drew the district’s boundaries 
on a copyrighted map and distributed multiple copies to local emer- 
gency service agencies. The court said this use was a “legitimate, fair, 
and reasonable purpose, namely the coordination of fire prevention 
activities in the unincorporated areas of Harris County.”64 
A “public access” to information argument was successful in N e w  
York T imes  u. Roxbury Data Interface,65 where the defendant used the 
N e w  York T i m e s  Index to make an index of personal names appearing 
in the New York Times. Again, the defendant’s profit motive was not 
recognized as determinative of infringement.66 The court said, “On its 
face, defendants’ index appears to have the potential to save researchers 
a considerable amount of time and, thus, facilitate the public interest in 
the dissemination of i n f ~ r r n a t i o n . ” ~ ~  AmericanIn Italian Book Corp. u. 
Broadcasting Co., Inc.“ the ABC evening news showed a float during 
the annual Gennaro Festival parade in New York’s Little Italy on which 
the participants were performing a copyrighted song. The publisher 
brought suit for infringement but the court found a fair use, noting that 
the event was surrounded by “considerable public intere~t.”~’ Further, 
the court said that the “[use] of the song was incidental to the overall 
informative purpose of the newscast.”70 
The argument that the use is designed to fill a public need, or in 
some way facilitate public access to information has had mixed success. 
The case of Iowa State Uniuersity Research Foundation u. American 
Broadcasting C O . ~ ~bears many similarities to the Italian Book Co. case. 
A television station was held an infringer when it used segments of a 
copyrightrd film in its coverage of the 1972 Olympics. The film por- 
trayed the biography of an Iowa State wrestler who was participating in 
the Olympics and won the gold metal. There can be little doubt that the 
Olympics is of “considerable public interest” or that the overall purpose 
of the use was to inform the public. In both cases the broadcasts inform 
the public of the events and personalities involved. The only readily 
distinguishable characteristic between the two cases is that ABC made 
the film in Italian Book,  while someone else made the film in Iowa 
State. ABC knew of the existence of the film and had turned it down 
before showing it in the Iowa State case.72 Otherwise the cases appear to 
be inconsistent. 
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Two cases of “public interest” infringement involved republica- 
tion of articles from publications of limited circulation. Rubzn u. Bos-
ton Magazine C O . , ~ ~involved the republication of parts of a doctoral 
dissertation that had been copyrighted and published in a psycology 
journal and again in the plaintiff’s own book before the defendant 
published a section of it accompanyingan article in a box entitled “Test 
of Love: How To Tell If It’s Really The magazine vigorously 
argued that they were presenting this information for the public 
enlightenment but the court held that the “format and content” showed 
the purpose was not to “acquaint the community with research”75 
The  second case involved a Harvard law student’s article in the 
student newpaper, T h e  Haruard Law Record. The article, documenting 
the experiences of Harvard law students in their summer clerkships, was 
reprinted verbatim in the Legal Tzmes of Washzngton except for two 
deleted paragraph^.^^ The court said, “the republication was for com- 
mercial rather than educational purposes.”77 
Boston Magazine, ABC, and the Legal Times are all for-profit 
organizations. However, the courts attached little importance to this 
fact in arriving at their decisions. In all three cases the use was a mixed 
informativelcommercial purpose. In Wzllzams & Wzlkzns the court 
emphasized that “NIH and NLM are non-profit institutions, devoted 
solely to the advancement and dissemination of medical k n ~ w l e d g e . ” ~ ~  
Years later, characterization of the user as not for profit appears to be 
losing potency as a defense for libraries. 
Factor 2: T h e  Nature of the Copyrzghted Work 
If a work can be characterized as primarily a historical or factual 
account, or in the public domain, then only the expression of the work, 
and not the contents, is protected. A man Hoehling researched the 
Hindenburg accident and determined that the cause of the fire was 
~abotage.~’This was not the first account of the accident that indicated 
sabotage.s0 Hoehling presented his book as a “factual account, written 
in an objective, reportorial style.”” The  court decided that a second 
author’s use of Hoehling’s material may be extensive and “signifi- 
cant...so long as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of 
another.’”’ 
If an original interpretation is given to facts in the public domain, 
then that interpretation is protected. For example, Dow Jones uses a list 
of stocks constituting public information to make its index.83 The  
copyright results from selecting representative stocks from the total 
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number of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Also pro- 
tected is the divisor, and the number generated by dividing the aggregate 
prices of the component stocks by the divisor.84 A minimum amount of 
effort must be expended by the author if his work is to be protected. 
In New York Times u. Roxbury Data Interfaces5 the court ruled for 
the defendant because he put forth “independent work ...p recisely the 
labor that an original indexer must undertake.”s6 In this case plaintiff, 
New York Times, already printed five indexes to its paper. The defend- 
ant noticed that the Times did not print a biographical index and 
proceeded to publish one. The defendant’s index was really an index of 
names derived from the other existing indexes.s7 The court described the 
Times’s copyright in its indexes as constituting “the correlation of data 
with citations to the pages and columns of the New York Times on 
which the data appears.”8s The court questioned “Whether or not 
millions of names scattered over more than one hundred volumes and 
integrated with a mass of other data can qualify as a c ~ m p i l a t i o n . ” ~ ~  
This amalgam is “in the nature of a collection of facts [rather] than in 
the nature of a creative or imaginative work.”g0 
The particular expression of an idea, concept, principle, or discov- 
ery connot be appropriated without a copyright infringement. In 
Rubinglthe Boston Magazine copiedverbatim dr. Rubin’s test. This was 
appropriation of his expression. the question arises whether there was 
any other way to state Dr. Rubin’s theory. If there had been only one way 
then idea and expression merged, and no  protection would have been 
available. 
Factor 3: T h e  Amount  and Substantiality of the Portion of the Copy- 
righted Work Used 
In one post-1978 case the substantiality element was determinative. 
In Quinto v. Legal Timesg2 the court said: “the admitted reprinting of 
approximately 92% of the plaintiff‘s story precludes the fair use defense 
under prior law.”93 Other courts have addressed the issue in terms of 
whether the alleged infringer used only what was needed to accomplish 
his purpose or used the essential part. 
In Bruzzone u. Miller Brewing C O . ’ ~the court first noted that the 
copying was “extremely fragmentary.”95 Then it stated a test for deter- 
mining substantiality: 
If a subsequent user must engage in such use in order to accomplish 

one of the purposes set forth in 17 USC 3107 ( e .g . ,research), and if 

such use is the minimum amount necessary to achieve such purpose, 
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and if the subsequent use does not compete with the original use-
...such use is considered fair use.% 
The question boils down to whether the user has abused the talents of 
another creator, or  properly used the first work as a stepping stone to 
another original work. 
A second approach, discussed in the R u b i n  case,97 is to determine 
the “essential part” of the work. The R u b i n  case involved the use of a 
test that would determine how people feel about each other. The  
magazine-defendant only copied the test which was not a substantial 
part of the plaintiff’s dissertation, but nevertheless was the essence of the 
paper. 
Factor 4:  T h e  Effect of the Use U p o n  the  Potential Market for or Value 
of the Copyrighted Work 
The courts since 1978 have looked either for competition or similar 
purpose as evidence of economic harm. The  Bruzzone court held that 
there was “no credible evidence” that defendant’s practices “impair(ed) 
the value of said adver t i sement~ .”~~The court also noted that acommer- 
cail was not the subject of Bruzzone’s testing until a significant portion 
of its useful life was e x p l ~ i t e d . ~ ~  Finally, the testing purpose was not the 
same purpose as that of the plaintiff advertiser. 
The Quinto’” and Iowa State University”’ cases concerned copy- 
righted works whose primary value was in the first use.lo2 The  first use 
would effectively extinguish the market. This is seldom true of mate-
rials kept in a library. Either a work has lasting value or there is no 
reason to keep it.  
The  Roxbury case illustrates an owner’s argument based on compe- 
tition. The  plaintiff argued that the defendant’s use deprived i t  of the 
right to exploit a potential market.lo4 The  court rejected this argument 
and held the defendant could take advantage of a market that waseither 
unseen or  untapped by the ~1aint i f f . l ’~ Similarly, Section 108(c) of the 
1976 Act permits libraries to restore lost or damaged works to their 
collections by copying them if an unused replacement cannot be 
obtained at a fair price. 
Conclusion 
Will iams & Wilk insremains the only case which deals with library 
copying. The  Will iams & Wilk ins  court recognized the four traditional 
factorslo6 but proceeded to craft its own fair-use test for libraries as 
follows: 
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The important factor is not the absolute amount, but the twin ele- 
ment of (i)  the existence and purpose of the system of limitation 
imposed and enforced, and (ii) the effectiveness of that system to 
confine the duplication for the personal use of scientific personnel 
who need the material for their 
It is disturbing to librarians that the Ninth Circuit in the Sony case 
sided with the dissent in Williams 8c Wilkins.’OBApparently, the judicial 
attitude has changed from approving use of technology which allows 
library researchers to break away from the handwritten, time-
consuming and error-ridden notes of the past to an attitude that repro- 
graphy leads to “mass reproduction”lm and grave harm to the 
publishers, writers and broadcasters. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The author expresses appreciation to his research assistant, Keith Trumbo, 
J.D., Chase College of Law ‘82. 
References 
1. Williams & Wilkins Co. 11. ITnited States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. C1. 1973). 
2. Williams & Wilkins Co. v .  United States, 420 LJ.S. 376, 43 L. Ed. 2d 264, 95 S. Ct. 
1344 (1975). 
3. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in title 17 
LT.S.C.). 
4. Universal City Studios, Inc. u. Soriy Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
5. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. ##108(g)(2),108(h)(1976). 
6. See infra r d  text accompanying notes 49-91, 
7. Senate Cotnm. on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-71 
(1975). 
8. House CoInm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
74-79 (1976), hereinafter citrd as H.  Rep. 
9. Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-74 (1976). 
10. H.  Rep., supra note 8, at 65-74. 
11. Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) Para. 25,145 (1980). 
12. Basic Books (a division of Harper & Row),CBS, Inc., (on behalf of Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston division), McGraw-Hill, Nelson-Hall, Prentice-Hall, Princeton University 
Press, and John Wiley & Sons. 
13. Itlid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) Para. 25,230 (1981 ). 
16. See, New York Times, 15 Der. 1982, at  1, col. 5-6. 
17. Williams & Wilkins Co. u. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1356-57 (Ct. C1. 1973). 
18. Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal (BNA) 24 (12 March 1982):35. 
19. Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal (BNA) 25 (19 Nov. 1982):138. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 196 
Fair Use Under the  1976 Copyright Act 
20. H. Rep. supra note 8, at 65-74. 
21. 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). 
22. Id. at 967. 
23. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Library Association No. 81-1687, Sony u. 
Universal City Studios, in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1982. 
24. 542 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.NY 1982). 
25. Amicus Curiae Brief S u p a  note 23. 
26. Publishers’ Weekly, 220 (30 Oct. 1981 ):24. 
27. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.§§lOl, 103(a)(l). 
28. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 5117 (revised 12 Dec. 1982). 
29. Compare Data Cash Systems, Inc. u. JS and A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063,203 
1J.S.P.Q. 735 (N.D.111. 1979), aff‘d on other ground 628 F.2d 1038, 208 U.S.P.Q. 197 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (ROM is a machine part) with Tandy Corp. u. Personal Microcomputers, Inc., 
524 F.Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (ROM is a copy) and Williams Electronics, Inc. u. Artic 
Intern, Inc. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir 1982) (ROM is a copy). 
30. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 5101. 
31. National Business Lists u. Dun & Bradstreet, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 
25,419 (11 June 1982). 
32. Dow Jones v. Chicago Board of Trade, 546 F.Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
33. Leon u. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937). 
34. de Sola Pool, Ithiel. “The Culture of Electronic Print.” Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences 17(Fall 1982):28-29. 
35. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§lOl, 105. 
36. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. u. Rickover, 268 F.Supp. 444 (D.DC. 1967). 
37. Reporters Commitfee for Freedom of the Press v. Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383 (D.DC. 
1977). 
38. H. Rep supra note 8, at 60. 
39. 15 U.S.C. 5290(e) (1976). 
40. H. Rep. supra note 8, at 59. 
41. 471 F. Supp. 426 (D. DC. 1979). 
42. Building Officials & Code Administrators u. Code Technology, Inc. 628 F.2d 730, 
(1st Cir. 1980). 
43. State of Georgia u. Harrison Co., 548 F.Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
44. H. Rep. supra note 8, at 70-72. 
45. O p  Att’y. Gen. 81-202 (Kan. 1981). 
46. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.§§110(2), (3), (4). 
47. 506 F.Supp. 1127 (1981). 
48. 3d. Cir. no. 81-1333 (1982), 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, cert. denied 4 Oct. 1982. 
49. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §107(1) (1976). 
50. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. NY 1977) (grantingapreliminary injuction) (casedecided 
in 1982, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 25, 443). 
51. Id. at 251. 
52. Id. at 252. 
53. Id. at 246. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 251. 
56. Id. 
57. Id., pp. 251-52. 
58. 202 IJSPQ 809 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
59. Id. at 810-11. 
60. Id. at 810. 
61. Id. at 811. 
62. Key Maps, Inc. u. J .J. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Italian Book Corp. 
u. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. NY 1978); New York Times u. 
Roxbury Data Intrrface, 434 F. Supp. 217 (D. NJ 1977). 
FALL 1983 197 
ROGER BILLINGS 
63. 470 F. Supp. at 35. 
64. Id. at 38. 
65. 434 F. Supp. 217 (D. N.J. 1977). 
66. Id. at 221. 
67. Id. at 221. 
68. 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. NY 1978). 
69. Id. at 68. 
70. Id. at 68. 
71. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980). 
72. Id. at 58-59. 
73. 645 F. 2d 80 ( 1 s t  Cir. 1981). 
74. Id. at 82. 
75. Id. at 84. 
76. Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. D.C. 1981). 
77. Id. at 560. 
78. 487 F.2d at 1354. 
79. A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
80. Id. at 975. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 980. 
83. Dow Jones v.Chicago Board of Trade, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) para 25,411, p. 
17,379 (22 June 1982). 
84. Id., para 17, 381. 
85. 434 F. Supp. 217 (D. N.J. 1977). 
86. Id. at 223. 
87. Id. at 218-19. 

88.Id. at 220. 

89. Id. 
90. Id. at 221. 
91. Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F. 2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981). 
92. 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. D.C., 1981). 
93. Id. at 560. 
94. 202 LJ S .P .Q.  809 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
95. Id. at 811. 
96. Id. at 812. 
97. Rubin u. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981). 
98. Bruzzone u. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809, 811 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
99. Id. at 811. 
100. Quinto 71. Legal Times, 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. D.C. 1981). 
101. Iowa State LJniversity Research Foundationu. AmericanBroadcasting Co., 621 F. 
2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980). 
102. 506 F. Supp at 560 and 621 F.2d at 62. 
103. New York Times u. Roxbury Data Interface, 434 F. Supp 217 (D. N.J. 1977). 
104. Id. at 224. 
105. Id. at 224-25. 
106. Williams & Wilkins Co.v.Unitedstates, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. C1. 1973) aff’dby 
equally divided court 420 U S .  376 (1975). 
107. Id. at 1355. 
108. Universal City Studios u. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981). 
109. Id. at 971. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 198 
